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Abstract 
Previous research shows that the experience of familiarity involves the experience of 
positive affect. In two experiments we clarify and extend this research by showing that the 
experience of familiarity involves the experience of positive affect even when the nature of the 
experimental task is non-affective and non-evaluative and even when participants are actively 
performing other cognitive operations – that the association of familiarity and positive affect is not 
disrupted by (non-affective and non-evaluative) judgments regardless of whether familiarity does 
or does not play a role in those judgments. Experiment 1 used a non-affective but evaluative task 
and Experiment 2 a completely non-evaluative task. Both studies manipulated familiarity through 
re-exposure and showed that processing familiar stimuli induced a pleasurable subjective 
experience.   
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Familiarity, wrote Titchener in 1910, is a “pleasant feeling” (p.411). Decades later, Pittman 
(1992, p.280) also characterized familiarity as “a feeling with a positive affective tone.” Instead of 
breeding the contempt suggested by the popular idiom, familiarity in these views induces hedonic 
content – a subjective experience of feeling good.   
The relationship between familiarity and positive affect was taken for granted in the 
literature which, for years, continued to accumulate replications of the mere-exposure effect: 
People like familiar stimuli (Zajonc, 1968; for a review see Bornstein, 1999). Preference or liking 
judgments, however, are only an indirect measure of the experience of positive affect (e.g., de 
Vries, Holland, Chenier, Starr, & Winkielman, 2010) and it was not until 2000 that researchers 
used a number of methodological strategies to focus on the possibility that a subjectively positive 
affective state might be experienced by participants when processing familiar stimuli.  
Harmon-Jones and Allen (2001), for example, provided further support for the association 
of familiarity with subjective positive affect using psychophysiological measures. Participants 
exhibited greater activity in facial muscles associated with positive affect (zygomatic muscle 
region) after exposure to familiar rather than unfamiliar photos. In addition, Garcia-Marques, 
Mackie, Claypool, and Garcia-Marques (2010) provided evidence that familiarity and positive 
affect share the same type of subjective experience, by showing that positivity and familiarity exert 
a bi-directional impact on each other’s judgment latencies. In an adaptation of the implicit 
association test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), participants categorized a series of 
words appearing in lowercase as positive or negative, intermixed with trials in which they 
categorized city names appearing in all capital letters as having been previously presented or not. 
The pattern of responses was the one typically found in IAT studies when two dimensions are 
closely related: when familiarity and positivity judgments shared the same response key, 
performance was facilitated (and inhibited when positivity and familiarity judgments required 
different response keys).  
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 If the experience of familiarity is equally the experience of positive affect, manipulations of 
one of these can be expected to bias judgments on the other, and they do. For example, Garcia-
Marques et al. (2004) showed that by subliminally priming stimuli with happy faces (activating 
positive affect), individuals falsely recognized the stimuli as familiar (Experiment 2), and that 
smiling faces (activating positive affect) were also more likely to be falsely recognized as familiar 
than neutral ones (Experiment 1; see also Monin, 2003). Similarly, Phaf and Rotteveel (2005) 
demonstrated that a subjective experience of  “happiness” (induced by asking participants to 
contract their zygomaticus muscles) led to neutral words falsely being judged as familiar. Other 
studies corroborated the association between positivity and familiarity by providing evidence that 
the manipulation of familiarity biases affective judgments. Claypool, Hugenberg, Housley, and 
Mackie, (2007), for example, showed that manipulations of facial familiarity triggered differential 
perceptions of facial affect, such that familiar faces seem happier and less angry than unfamiliar 
ones.  
Together, this body of research clearly suggests that as Titchener and Pittman maintained, 
the experience of familiarity involves the experience of a diffuse positive affective state.  
Interestingly, however, all of the experiments described here in support of this contention implicitly 
or explicitly primed an affective context. Thus, evidence for the link between familiarity and 
affective experiences in this body of research has been demonstrated in conditions under which 
familiarity is associated with an affective context, induced by asking participants preference or 
liking or attractiveness or emotion judgments. 
Only one study, and the very first to broach the issue, assessed subjective mood while not 
asking participants to make evaluative or affective judgments. Monahan, Murphy, and Zajonc 
(2000, Experiment 1) asked participants to attend to a “blank screen” and subsequently to report 
“how do you feel?”  Half of the participants were unknowingly exposed on that screen to 5 Chinese 
ideographs (subliminal presentations), each repeated five times. The other half of the participants 
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were exposed to 25 different ideographs. Participants in the first condition reported being in a better 
“current mood” than participants in the second condition. Note, however, that this effect occurred 
under conditions in which familiarity was induced unconsciously and performance of no other task 
was required, so that participants just stared at what appeared to be a blank screen. In addition, the 
experience of repetition (in and of itself) was exclusive to participants in the familiar stimuli 
condition. This single study is thus the only one to provide evidence that exposure to repeated, and 
therefore familiar, stimuli seems to generate a diffuse positive affective state, and the conditions 
under which this result was obtained were very restricted. 
Our research was thus intended to make three contributions.   First, we wished to provide 
evidence that familiarity is experienced as a diffuse positive state even under conditions that are 
independent of the affective or evaluative nature of the experimental task (that is, when 
participants' goals are not to express their “preferences” or  “likes” or so forth).  In doing so we 
would also provide a conceptual replication of the single study in the literature that appears to 
support this point.  Second, we wished to demonstrate that familiarity is experienced as a diffuse 
positive state even when participants are actively performing other cognitive operations – that the 
association of familiarity and positive affect is strong enough that it is not easily disrupted by other 
(non-affective and non-evaluative) judgments being made.  Such disruption is easily imagined 
taking a misattributional perspective, for example, where the use of any current experience to 
support one task may prevent it being attributed to affect (e.g. Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994). To 
our knowledge, no previous experiment has assessed incidental affect when participants were 
actively performing another non-affective task, leaving open the question about whether the 
familiarity-positive affect association holds when individuals have other goals. We thus sought 
evidence that familiarity is indeed felt positively even when individuals are actively performing 
another task, and also investigated whether that effect occurred when the simultaneous task was 
unrelated to any current feelings of familiarity or even when the task required those feelings of 
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familiarity. Third, we intended to provide this evidence in paradigms in which the experience of 
repetition (by itself) is experimentally controlled for. Thus our experiments were designed to show 
that it is not the “experience of repetition” that feels good (a possibility left open by the Monahan et 
al. study), but the “processing of familiar stimuli” that does so.  In two experiments we predicted 
that even under these conditions, the experience of familiarity leads participants to also report being 
in a better mood.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 In this experiment, participants were required to rate the perceived truth of both repeated 
and novel statements. Previous research has repeatedly demonstrated a familiarity-truth effect, such 
that the experience of familiarity increases truth judgments, with familiar statements perceived as 
truer than unfamiliar statements (Bacon, 1979; Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985). Thus, if participants’ 
responses revealed a familiarity-truth effect, we could reasonably infer that they were experiencing 
appropriate levels of familiarity when processing each statement.  We predicted that in contrast to 
when they processed novel statements, participants processing familiar statements would not only 
rate them as truer, but more relevant to our goals, they would also report a pleasurable subjective 
experience.  Such results would thus advance multiple goals.  First, they would confirm that 
familiarity is experienced positively, even when the judgments that participants are asked to make 
are non-affective.  Second, they would show that familiarity is experienced as a diffuse positive 
state even when participants are actively performing another task at the same time, and even when 
performance of that task is known to depend on the experience of familiarity itself. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred seventy one undergraduate students (72.4% females, aged between 17-23, 
from ISPA- Instituto Universitário, Portugal) volunteered to participate. Participants were randomly 
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distributed to the 16 cells created by crossing the two experimental conditions (Novel or Repeated) 
and eight versions of the materials. 
Stimulus materials 
Our stimuli set comprised recordings of 96 plausible sentences of uncertain truth-value 
(following Bacon, 1979), half of which were actually true. These statements were divided randomly 
into four subsets. Each subset contained 12 true statements (i.e., "A baby elephant sucks with its 
mouth") and 12 false ones (i.e., "A baby elephant sucks with its trunk"). As illustrated by the 
previous example, the false statements were false versions of the true ones. The false and true 
versions of a sentence never appeared in the same subset, with the result that list A1 and A2 were  
true or false versions of the same sentences and lists B1 and B2 were true or false versions of the 
same sentences. All items were randomly organized within each list, and each list was preceded by 
four similarly-rated buffer items. The lists were recorded by the same female voice (one sentence 
every 10s). Eight different lists were created to ensure that materials and status of the stimuli as 
repeated or novel was counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
The procedure closely followed the typical truth effect paradigm (see, Dechêne, Stahl, 
Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). Participants were told they would perform several tasks. The first task 
was the exposure phase, in which participants listened to one of the lists (A1, A2, B1, or B2; 
approximately one-fourth of the participants heard each list) while circling a number that best 
represented their rating of how interesting each of the 24 sentences was (1 = Not Interesting to 7 = 
Very Interesting).  
The second task comprised the familiarity manipulation. Participants were exposed to 46 
written statements that they were required to judge as true or false: participants were informed that 
half of the sentences were true and half were false. The first 36 items were randomly presented 
items. The experience of familiarity was manipulated by the status of the last 10 statements in the 
Familiarity feels good      9  
list.  In the unfamiliar condition, the last 10 items were all novel (that is, from a list other than the 
one participants had heard in the exposure phase), whereas in the familiar condition, the last 10 
statements were all repeated (that is, they had been encountered in the exposure phase).  To make 
sure that participants experienced overall an equal number of familiar and novel items, the first 36 
items in unfamiliar condition (where the final 10 items were all novel) included 16 novel items 
interspersed with 20 repeated items (that is, items encountered during the exposure phase) whereas 
the first 36 items in the familiar condition (where the final 10 items were all repeated) included 16 
repeated items interspersed with 20 novel items.  As it was presented, participants rated the 
likelihood of each statement's being true or false on a scale from 1 = Certainly False to 7 = 
Certainly True, with the midpoint labeled Completely Uncertain.  
The third task assessed the dependent measure. Immediately after processing the final 10 
either repeated or novel items, participants responded to a “current mood” scale (following 
Monahan et al., 2000) developed for the Portuguese population (Garcia-Marques, 1999; 2004). 
Participants used an 11-point scale (1= It describes my current mood very badly to 11 = It describes 
my current mood state very well) to react to three statements: “My state of mind is positive”, “I am 
feeling a little bit down”, and “I am not feeling good”. The two negative items were reversed 
scored so that high scores indicated positive mood. Finally, participants were asked if they had 
noticed that some items had been repeated from the alleged first study (statement interest ratings) 
and if they had purposefully rated as true any item they thought was repeated (“yes” or “no” 
answers). 
                                                 Results and Discussion 
Eleven participants reported explicitly using recall of items from the interest exposure phase 
to decide if a statement was true or false. Since such a strategy might provide an alternative 
explanation of the results, data from these participants were excluded from further analysis. Three 
participants failed to answer the mood items, resulting in variation in reported degrees of freedom. 
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Truth Ratings 
 We first examined truth ratings of the first 36 items in the list. Participants' estimations of 
the truth of the first 36 statements, averaged across repeated and novel statements, were entered as 
a within-subjects factor in 2 (Repeated vs. Novel statements) x 8 (versions of material) x 2 (Final 
block: Repeated vs.  Novel items) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ratings revealed a 
truth effect  with repeated statements rated truer (M = 5.51, SE = 0.07) than novel statements (M = 
4.26, SE= 0.03), F(1, 154) = 267.75, p < .001,  h2= 0.63, with no other significant effects. These 
results confirmed that participants experienced different levels of familiarity as they heard repeated 
and novel statements. 
 Even more importantly, an identical ANOVA revealed a truth effect in participants’ ratings 
of the final 10 items, where the average rating of repeated statements in the familiar condition was 
higher (M = 5.43, SE = 0.114) than ratings of the novel items in the unfamiliar condition (M = 4.12, 
SE = 0.06), F(1, 155) = 99.10, p < .001, hp2=0.40.  
Mood Ratings 
  Our dependent measure was assessed by participants’ responses to the three mood items 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .85). These responses were averaged and analysed in a by 2 (Repeated vs. 
Novel final items) x 8 (versions of material) ANOVA. As expected, participants reported feeling 
significantly more positive (M = 7.10, SE =0.28) after evaluating repeated statements than after 
evaluating novel statements (M = 6.32, SE =0.27), F(1, 151)=4.17, p=.043, hp2=0.03.  
 These results demonstrate that even with the goal of rating the truth of a statement, 
participants had a more positive hedonic experience, and thus reported being in a better mood, 
when they processed familiar (repeated) rather than unfamiliar (novel) items. This effect held even 
when participants were cognitively engaged in making judgments, and even when those judgments 
were non-affective.  Even more importantly, they occurred when participants were using their 
experience of familiarity to support making those other judgments. If the association between 
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familiarity and ratings of subjective positive affect were the merely the result of a misattribution of 
feelings of familiarity, it is unlikely that such misattribution could have resulted in familiarity 
effects on truth judgments and on hedonic effect judgments. Here we show that the experience of 
familiarity altered truth judgments just as it typically does but nevertheless, at the same time, 
participants experiencing familiarity also felt more positive. This pattern of results suggests that 
positivity is intrinsic to familiarity as the attribution of feelings of familiarity to truth judgments 
does not disrupt such positivity. Thus, the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1 supports both 
our claim that positivity is intrinsic to familiarity and that this positive experience occurs even 
when participants are actively engaged in a simultaneous task to which familiarity is also relevant. 
In this experiment we relied on the truth effects paradigm to ensure that participants were in 
fact experiencing familiarity and relying on those feelings in making judgments.  We also used the 
truth effects paradigm because making truth judgments is evaluative but not affective (as are 
preference judgments). However, it is possible that evaluating statements as true may be more 
affectively positive than evaluating statements as false. We tested that possibility by analyzing the 
relation between participants’ ratings of the perceived truth of the last 10 items and their assessed 
mood across the two conditions and found no significant relationship (t<1). Nevertheless, it was 
perhaps possible that those participants who ended the experiment by evaluating statements as true 
may have felt that they performed more successfully (and were thus happier) than those who ended 
my making more ‘false” judgments, an alternative explanation that is eliminated in Experiment 2.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In this experiment, we replicated Monahan et al. (2000) more closely in promoting 
familiarity with repetition occurring outside participants' conscious awareness, but at the same time 
included a control group that had the same type of repetition experience. Thus the experiment was 
designed to reveal whether the “experience of repetition” feels good (a possibility left open by the 
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Monahan et al. study) or the “processing of familiar stimuli” (as we claim) feels good.   In addition, 
in this experiment participants made simultaneous judgments that were not only non-affective but 
were also non-evaluative: location judgments.   Location judgments were also used in Experiment 2 
because the relative ease of making these judgments meant that all participants experienced equal 
amounts of “success.” During the first part of the experimental task participants were subliminally 
exposed to stimuli that were either the same as or different from stimuli they processed at the end 
of the task. Participants then performed a task that did not rely on the experience of familiarity, was 
completely independent of any affective cues, and generated the same level of success and thus 
confidence in both the unfamiliarity and familiarity conditions.  
We once again expected those experiencing familiarity (because of re-exposure to 
previously encountered stimuli) to report enhanced positive mood.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty-six undergraduate students (71.7% female, aged between 17-26,  from ISPA- Instituto 
Universitário, Portugal) were randomly assigned to conditions in which they saw either familiar or 
unfamiliar items. Materials were counterbalanced so that the novel items in one condition were the 
repeated items in the other condition. The design was thus a 2 (Novel vs. Repeated items) x 2 
(Stimulus Set) factorial design. 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
Participants took part in an alleged study about perception. In each trial, participants were 
instructed to focus on a plus sign presented in the center of the computer screen and to indicate 
whether a stimulus string was presented above (key labeled with a upwards arrow) or below (key 
labeled with a downwards arrow) the plus sign. These keys were the S and the L of a regular 
keyboard and were counterbalanced in order to control for handedness. Although the experiment 
had three phases (see Figure 1), participants engaged in this same location task throughout, 
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responding to the different symbol sets that appeared on the screen. Those symbols belonged to one 
of two sets of 8 strings of 2 or 3 symbols (see Figure 1) which were counterbalanced as Novel or 
Repeated targets, and were intermixed with fillers composed of symbols not used as targets. 
In the first phase, participants were supraliminarly presented (until participants pressed a 
key) with four different strings of four repeated letters (XXXX,  ZZZZ,  WWWW,  KKKK) that 
masked a subliminal (80 ms) randomized presentation of each symbol string in the target set. Since 
each of the eight targets was presented three times, participants saw a total of 24 stimuli strings. 
Half of the participants were subliminally exposed to one of the target sets, and the other half to the 
other target set. In the second phase, participants were presented supraliminally with ten of the 
filler strings and continued to make location judgments. The third phase manipulated the activation 
of a feeling of familiarity. Participants in the unfamiliar condition were presented supraliminally 
with a final block of eight novel strings (i.e., selected from the set not previously presented), 
whereas participants in the familiarity condition saw a supraliminal final block of eight repeated  
strings (i.e., selected from the subliminally presented block).  
 
Figure 1. Procedure and illustration of stimuli used across the three experimental phases.  
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To assess the dependent measures, participants immediately completed a “post-
experimental questionnaire" where, among other items, they reported how they felt “right now" by 
using three 9-point scales (where 1 = Sad, Negative, Bad, and 9 = Happy, Positive, Good 
respectively; see Garcia-Marques, 2004).   
Results and Discussion 
Responses to the three mood scales (Cronbach’s alpha = .62) were averaged and analyzed in 
a 2 (Repeated vs. Novel final block) x 2 (Stimulus Set) ANOVA, revealing only a significant main 
effect for familiarity, F (1, 42) = 5.37, p =  .025, h2=0.11. Participants reported their mood to be 
significantly more positive (M = 6.61, SE = 0.24) after exposure to a final block of familiar stimuli 
than after exposure to unfamiliar stimuli (M = 5.76, SE = 0.27). No other effects were significant 
(Stimuli set: F(1, 42)=1.62, p = .210; Interaction F < 1).  
The task was performed both accurately (96% correct responses) and relatively quickly, 
with no effect of condition in response latencies (t < 1).  
As expected, participants re-exposed to previously encountered items reported being 
happier than participants exposed to novel items. This re-exposure to familiar items improved 
mood relative to those in the unfamiliar condition. This is of particular interest given that the goal 
of the task participants were performing  (i.e., location determination) was entirely independent of 
stimuli familiarity and was completely non-affective. Moreover, all participants were submitted to 
the same subliminal experience of items being repeated and were never consciously aware of the 
repetition manipulation.  
These results support our claim that familiarity is experienced as a diffuse positive state 
even when the experimental task involves neither an affective nor even an evaluative dimension. 
They also provide a conceptual replication of the single study in the literature (Monahan et al., 
2000) that shows familiarity is sufficient for the generation of positive mood (while making 
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methodological changes that show the results to be independent of the repetition process itself). 
Further, the results show that the familiarity induces positive affect even when other judgments are 
actively made.  Finally, these results show that the findings from Experiment 1 did not depend on 
the ease with which the task was performed or any condition-dependent feelings of success.  
 
General Discussion 
Results from two experiments demonstrate that the experience of familiarity induced by re-
exposure increases the subjective experience of positivity. We manipulated familiarity via both 
supraliminal and subliminal repetition and showed that exposure to familiar stimuli was 
accompanied by enhanced ratings of subjective positive affect even if participants simultaneously 
performed a non-affective and non-evaluative task. Familiarity was experienced as a diffuse 
positive state regardless of whether the familiarity they experienced was used in a simultaneously 
performed task (truth judgments) or not (perception and location task).  That is, even when the 
experience of familiarity appeared to be used to make truth judgments, increased subjective 
positive affect was still experienced.  Moreover, increased positive affect was observed even in a 
very easy successfully accomplished task only when accompanied by the experience of processing 
familiar stimuli. Even when familiarity did not increase processing speed because detection of the 
stimuli was already very easy, it impacted subsequent mood rating. Thus, the link between 
familiarity and positive affect is not influenced by whether or not a) a simultaneous cognitive task 
is performed; b) the context has an affective or evaluative nature; c) a simultaneous task engages 
affective or evaluative goals; d) task performance depends on the experience of familiarity; or e) 
task performance is facilitated by the ease of processing familiar stimuli. 
Our findings thus make three contributions. First, we provided evidence that familiarity is 
experienced as a diffuse positive state even under conditions that are independent of the affective or 
evaluative nature of the experimental task (that is, when participants' goals are not to express their 
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“preferences” or  “likes” or so forth).  Second, we demonstrated that familiarity is experienced as a 
diffuse positive state even when participants are actively performing other cognitive operations. 
Familiarity was experienced positively even when the experience of familiarity was being used to 
perform a simultaneous task, and even when familiarity was irrelevant to the task at hand. Third, 
we provide evidence that it is not the “experience of repetition” that feels good but the “processing 
of familiar stimuli” that does so. Our experiments thus extend the range of conditions under which 
the familiarity-affect association has been found, as well as eliminate alternative explanations for 
its occurrence, while adding another conceptual replication to the very small body of work that 
shows that the subjective experience of familiarity involves the subjective experience of a positive 
affective state.  
 The idea that the experience of familiarity is itself an inherently positive experience (e.g., 
Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000, 2004; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Reber et al., 1989) is argued 
to rely on the fact that re-exposure to stimuli is associated with memory activation promoting an 
ease or fluency of processing. Manipulations other than repetition (e.g., high colour contrast and 
fonts that are easier to read) that enhance stimulus fluency also increase stimulus liking (Reber, 
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). This suggests that any increase of 
fluency would also increase positive feelings. Our results suggest that even when the task is a very 
easy fluent one (Experiment 2), processing of a familiar stimuli is still associated with positive 
affect. The experience associated with the processing of repeated stimuli is detected even when 
fluency is already high, suggesting that there may be other features of processing familiar stimuli 
other than processing fluency itself that contribute to the experience of familiarity as one of 
positive affect. However, this is an empirical question yet to be addressed. 
Our work further strengthens the evidential base for a claimed link between familiarity and 
positive affect by demonstrating that familiarity is associated with subject positive affect across a 
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range of conditions never previously tested. It should be noted that although the literature claims 
that familiarity breeds content, some studies challenge the universality of this link either because 
they do not find evidence to support it or because they show that it can be moderated. For example, 
Sergerie et al. (2007) show opposite effects to the ones reported by Garcia-Marques et al. (2004) by 
demonstrating that in their experiment participants tended to perceive sad faces as familiar and 
happy faces as “new.” Also, De Vries et al. (2010) showed that happy mood eliminates the 
preference for familiar stimuli and the absence of familiarity effects on physiological measures of 
affect (EMG, zygomaticus muscle activity). Likewise, Liao, Shimojo, and Yeh’s (2013) findings 
suggest that the affective nature of the stimuli is a moderator of the link between familiarity and 
positive affect by showing that it only is observed for sad faces but not for happy ones. Together, 
these studies may challenge either the idea that familiarity is inherently positive, or at least that the 
association between familiarity and positive affect is an intrinsic one (in the sense that both are 
experienced in similar ways). However, there are alternative explanations for all these data (as the 
authors themselves acknowledge), the most important of which is the idea that familiarity is a 
relative feeling (Whittlesea, 1993; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Thus, if positive affect is already 
high, the affective component of the experience of familiarity is already present, making an 
increase (or noticing an increase) less likely. Alternatively, even if familiarity is experienced as 
positive, the emotional context may lead it to be discounted by misattributing it to the preexisting 
happy state. These possibilities are starting places for the empirical research that needs to be 
conducted to better understand how these apparently contradictory effects were observed. 
The implications of familiarity being charged with positive affect have been widely 
discussed (for a review see Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003).  We also have 
argued elsewhere that an inherent relationship between familiarity and positive affect may help 
explain several other well-established effects (see Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2000). For example, 
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both the experience of positivity (for a review see Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Garcia-Marques, 1998) 
and the experience of familiarity (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001; Johnston & Hawley, 1994; 
Reder & Ritter, 1992) increase top-down, less detailed processing in a variety of domains, but the 
two effects have not previously been thought of as emanating from a common process. On an even 
more far-reaching level, the notion that familiarity is affectively charged challenges traditional 
distinctions between affect and cognition. If such distinctions break down, the classic view of affect 
and cognition as independent systems is equally undermined. In turn, this challenges the 
assumption that affect impacts cognitive processing only as one more external variable (see also 
Damasio, 1994; Oatley & Johnson- Laird, 1987; Simon, 1967). Instead, it suggests that affect is an 
integral part of cognition: that “to think” may also mean “to feel.”  If so, Titchener’s (1910) 
original observation that familiarity is a pleasant feeling has far-reaching implications.  
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